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The paper examines the relationship between UK wholesale gas prices and the 
Brent oil price over the period 1996-2003 in order to investigate whether oil and 
gas prices ‘decoupled’ during this period as orthodox gas market liberalisation 
theory suggests. Tests for Unit Roots and Cointegration are carried out and it is 
discovered that a long run equilibrium relationship between UK gas and oil 
prices exists. Moreover, this relationship predates the opening of the UK-
Mainland Europe Inter-connector.  Following a recursive methodology (Hansen 
& Johansen 1999), it was found that the cointegrating relationship is present 
throughout the sample period.  However, the long run solutions seem to be more 
volatile. Evidence is provided that the short run relationship is linear and 
impulse response functions are used to examine the effects that a shock in oil 
would have on gas. These findings do not support the assumption that gas prices 
and oil prices ‘decouple’.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A fundamental assumption of those who strongly support the liberalisation of 
natural gas markets (structural reforms leading to the emergence of full gas-on-
gas competition) is that under a fully liberalised regime gas and oil prices 
‘decouple’. It is also generally assumed that after such ‘decoupling’, gas prices 
fall significantly with consequent welfare benefits to consumers. The pre-
liberalisation regime of gas prices ‘coupled’ to oil prices reflects (so it is argued) the 
market power of state or private sector gas monopolies to extract rent from gas 
consumers for whom oil and its products are the only alternative fuels in many domestic 
and industrial uses. 
 
A classic statement of this proposition is that of Barton and Vermeire (1999) who 
argue that in a liberalised gas market “the linkage with oil prices is now much less 
transparent”. They argue that after liberalisation, gas prices fluctuate between two 
bounds, the higher one set by interfuel competition in industries where gas and 
oil are close substitutes and the lower bound determined by the marginal cost of 
extracting gas from the reservoir. Since 1994 the UK gas market has become 
progressively liberalised and by 2003 was probably the most highly liberalised 
gas industry in the World.1  
 
In a similar vein Heren (1999) argued that since liberalisation, UK gas prices 
diverged from those on the Continent because they were no longer influenced by 
                                                 
1 The UK gas market exhibits all the key features of a highly liberalised market. Wholesale gas 
trading takes place on liquid spot and futures markets. Consumers – right down to the individual 
domestic customer – can choose their gas supplier. Competing gas suppliers have third party 
access to the country’s gas transportation system. The gas transportation system is supervised by 
a regulatory authority guaranteeing non-discriminatory access and tariffs. At present the UK is 
the only gas market in the world which exhibits all these features. In comparison, a liberalised 
gas market in Continental Europe can be said to barely exist. Most gas is still sold on long-term 
contracts with prices determined in advance and frequently linked to the crude oil or heavy fuel 
price. In the USA gas markets are liberalised to a considerable degree but, unlike the UK, final 
domestic consumers do not, in general, have a choice of individual gas supplier. 
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the oil price. The latter also argues that UK gas prices had benefited from the 
development of spot pricing which had accompanied the deregulation of 
industrial gas markets and stated that "The British spot price is now widely accepted 
as the measure of the commodity’s value in the British market, and the benefits of lower 
prices have in general been passed through to the consumer. European border prices, on 
the other hand, owe nothing to the actual market conditions in the gas industry, and 
everything to the oil price" (Heren 1999, p7). Before the liberalisation of the UK gas 
market it was certainly the case that UK gas prices closely followed the pre-
liberalisation ‘Barton and Vermeire paradigm’.  In evidence to the Monopolies 
and Mergers Commission (MMC) in 1988, British Gas made it quite clear that it 
indexed gas prices in the un-regulated so-called ‘contract’ market (the market for 
industrial and large commerc i a l  c o n s u m e r s )  t o  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  c r u d e  o i l  a n d  
petroleum products (MMC, 1988).  British Gas was also accused of  price 
discrimination and restricting third party access to its pipeline system. Following 
this, and a further Monopolies and Mergers Commission investigation in 1993, 
British Gas was required to introduce a number of reforms including the internal 
unbundling of its supply and transportation functions and the release of part of 
its portfolio of upstream gas supplies to competitors. While the price of gas to 
domestic consumers was not fully deregulated until 2002, the competitive sector 
of the market - ‘contract’ sales – witnessed a substantial fall in prices between 
1994 and 1998, seemingly confirming the views of those that supported the 
general liberalisation thesis (International Energy Agency, IEA, 1998).  
 
However, between mid-1999 and the end of 2000, UK wholesale natural gas 
prices, which had remained at very low levels since the spot and futures markets 
were first established in 1995-1996, increased very substantially, with prices 
almost doubling. This rapid increase in the price of gas was concomitant with 
that occurring in the international oil market, where the price of Brent Crude oil 
increased by more than one hundred per cent during 1999. Between 2001 and   5
2003 UK gas prices continued to experience much greater volatility than 
previously and, by late 2002, the rising oil price was again accompanied by rising 
gas prices. More recently, the surge in oil prices since 2003 was once again 
associated with UK gas prices reaching record levels.  
 
As a result of the initial unexpected increase in gas prices during 1999-2000, the 
UK Government commissioned a report that concluded that UK gas prices had 
risen because the oil-gas price linkage had become re-established (ILEX 2001). 
They argued that the main factor explaining the rise in the gas price through 
1999-2000 was the physical link that had recently been established between the 
UK and oil-indexed Continental gas markets as a result of the opening of the UK-
Belgium Interconnector gas pipeline at the end of 1998. This established a 
relationship between two gas markets which had previously been quite 
independent of one another.  It concluded that “the link with oil indexed gas prices 
on the Continent is the most important factor in explaining the rise in UK gas prices 
through 2000” (ILEX 2001, p.3). 
 
The Interconnector pipeline between Bacton in Norfolk and Zeebrugge in 
Belgium was originally built to allow UK gas to be supplied to Continental 
markets where reserves and gas productio n  a r e  m u c h  l o w e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  U K .    
However, the flow of gas can be reversed (albeit at a smaller rate than the flow 
from the UK to the Continent). After the opening of the Interconnector in 
October 1998, initially gas began to flow in this ‘reverse’ direction, from the 
Continent to the UK. However, with Continental gas prices rising sharply in 
1999, it became clear to UK gas traders that arbitrage profits were available, 
selling UK gas, via the Interconnector, into the higher-priced Continental 
markets where gas prices are indexed to the price of oil (either crude or fuel oil) 
in long-term contracts. These arbitrage activities between the UK and   6
Continental gas markets which led to price convergence between the two 
markets therefore also indirectly linked UK gas prices to the rising price of oil.  
 
The question of the relationship between oil and gas prices in liberalised and 
unliberalised gas markets is of considerable importance. If it is correct that after 
liberalisation gas and oil prices do indeed ‘decouple’ then the current efforts of 
the European Commission to compel European countries to follow the UK route 
leading to full liberalisation may produce considerable welfare benefits for both 
European and UK citizens. However, if the fundamental assumption about 
‘decoupling’ is incorrect – if there exists some fundamental factors underlying 
the historically close relationship between oil and gas prices which cannot easily 
be dispelled by the type of measures currently being contemplated by the 
European Commission – then clearly the mandatory liberalisation of European 
gas industries may turn out to be a futile exercise. In this context, Wright (2006) 
has argued that liberalisation of the European gas industries along UK lines 
could actually result in higher and certainly more volatile gas prices.  
 
To provide a more rigorous definition of both ‘coupling’ and ‘decoupling’ it will 
be useful to employ the following expression: 
 
 An p1t = α + β  An p2t           (1) 
 
where  p1t and p2t are the prices of gas and oil respectively, ln is the natural 
logarithm,α  is a constant term (the log of a proportionality coefficient that 
captures differences in the levels of the prices) and β  gives the relationship 
between the prices. If β = 0 there is no relationship between the prices i.e. they 
are completely ‘decoupled’; if β =1 the prices are proportional.  
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In this paper we intend to use cointegration analysis to answer the following 
questions. 
 
(i) Is there a cointegrating (long-run) relationship between UK gas prices and oil 
prices in the period since liberalisation commenced (c1994) or did oil and gas 
prices permanently de-couple’ at this time as Barton and Vermeire (1999) 
suggest?  
 
(ii) If cointegration is shown to be present, did this occur only after the 
Interconnector was opened (as suggested in ILEX 2001) or did it pre-date the 
opening? 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The recent literature is reviewed in 
section 2. Section 3 provides more information about the data set, describing the 
different gas price series that were available to us at the time of writing. Unit root 
and cointegration tests are considered in Section 4. The error correction models 
are given in Section 5.  The discussion of the empirical analysis and the impulse 
response function analysis is provided in Sections 6 and 7 respectively. Finally, 
Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
There is a small but growing volume of literature examining the statistical 
relationship between different energy prices some of which is directly relevant to 
our own investigation. De Vany and Walls (1999), used cointegration methods to 
model regional US electricity markets and to assess price integration between 
these markets. Using a vector error correction model, the authors provided 
strong evidence of cointegration between eleven regional electricity markets in   8
the US.  Hendry and Juselius (2000, 2001) discussed extensively the cointegrating 
relations between weekly gasoline prices at different locations.  
 
In a univariate framework, Robinson (2000) analysed the behaviour of electricity 
prices in England and Wales since the creation of their spot market in 1990. It 
was argued that the process is nonlinear and a logistic smooth transition model 
(LSTAR) was fitted. Electricity and gas markets are similar in the sense that these 
commodities have been deregulated over the last decade in many countries. 
Since deregulation, prices for these commodities have become more volatile. 
However, Huisman and Mahieu (2001) demonstrated that electricity prices have 
been much more volatile than gas prices, partly due to the non-storability of 
electricity.  
 
Serletis and Herbert (1999) examined the long term trends between different 
energy prices in North America. They found cointegration between the price of 
natural gas and fuel oil, indicating effective arbitraging mechanisms between 
those markets, but no such relationship was found with the price of electricity. 
They used univariate and bivariate models to make inferences about the time 
series relations between energy prices. However, the authors use data of a short 
time span – only one year – in their analysis and they admit that an approach 
based on the use of higher-dimensional VARs and impulse response functions 
would be more robust. This study does employ these techniques in analysising 
the relationship between the UK gas price and oil prices (see sections 5 and 6).  
More recently, Narayan and Smith (2005) in a single equation framework, have 
employed the bounds testing approach to cointegration to model residential 
demand for electricity in Australia.    
 
Contrasting with the argument presented by ILEX (2001), which posits a link 
between gas and oil prices which is fundamentally dependent upon the existence   9
of contractual terms linking oil and gas prices in a non-liberalised gas market, 
Barcella (1999) discovered a relationship between oil and gas prices in the 
liberalised US gas market which, she argued, was based on more fundamental 
and long-run economic factors.  It was found that crude oil and natural gas prices 
were highly correlated in the US, “yearly trends in crude oil and natural gas prices 
…are highly correlated, with a coefficient of 0.916. The weekly gas and fuel oil prices… 
are less highly correlated, but are cointegrated” (Barcella, 1999, p.12).  It is argued that 
the close relationship between natural gas and oil prices (both crude and fuel oil) 
reflected the underlying economic fact that the fuels were substitutes for one 
another in a large number of industrial processes.  In particular the study refers 
to “the significant inter-fuel competition in the electric power sector.”  
 
However, recently Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) find evidence of weak 
integration between crude oil, natural gas and coal markets in the USA. Testing 
for a cointegrating relationship between oil and gas prices they find that these 
are “cointegrated in the long run and exhibit stronger evidence of market integration. 
Nevertheless the relationship is weak compared to the market integration we observe 
among [regionally different] crude oils or Western coals”. In accounting for the rather 
weak cointegration between oil and gas prices, in contrast to Barcella (1999), they 
argue that it is only in certain limited industrial processes, such as residential and 
commercial heating, that there is direct competition and substitutability between 
oil and natural gas. In the most important sector of the oil market – motor vehicle 
transportation –there is almost no substitutability with natural gas. Asche et al 
(2002) provide a discussion of the structure of the take-or-pay contracts and 
evidence that the continental market for gas is integrated. Gjølber and Johnsen 
(1999) investigate the link between crude oil and several refined products like 
fuel oil, finding this to be high and accordingly increasing the likelihood of 
finding evidence of market integration between crude oil and natural gas. 
   10
Finally, a recent paper by Asche et al. (2006) has a particular relevance for our 
study since it raises similar questions. But (i) is methodologically different, (ii) 
provides different results and (iii) draws different conclusions.  They look at the 
decoupling of gas, oil and electricity prices and claim that the opening of the 
Interconnector leads to the liberalized UK natural gas market and the regulated 
Continental gas markets becoming physically integrated and the ‘the Continental 
gas price [becoming] dominant.’ However they also note that in an interim period – 
after liberalisation of the UK gas market and the opening up of the 
Interconnector – the UK gas market ‘had neither government price regulation nor a 
physical Continental gas linkage.’ They use this period (1995-1998), which they 
describe as ‘an unusual combination of deregulation and autarky’ to explore if 
decoupling of natural gas prices from prices of other energy commodities – oil 
and electricity – took place.2 
 
Using cointegration methods (Johansen) Asche et al. (2006) found evidence of an 
integrated UK energy market in the period when the gas market was liberalised 
but not yet linked to the Continent (1995-1998) and conclude that this supports 
their theory of a single UK energy market where energy prices are determined in 
the global market with the world oil price operating as an exogenous 
determining variable. The authors also test the period after the opening of the 
Interconnector between 1998 and 2002, but find no evidence of cointegration 
between UK natural gas, Brent oil and electricity prices in this period. These 
results are indeed interesting because they are precisely the opposite of what we 
would have expected (i.e. cointegration after 1998, no cointegration between 1995 
and 1998, see also ILEX, 2001). 
                                                 
2 Throughout, the authors use the term ‘deregulation’ rather than liberalisation. In our opinion use of the 
term ‘deregulation’ is misleading. The UK gas market was not ‘deregulated’ in the period to which they 
refer. The unbundled transportation network remained tightly regulated as did the domestic sector of the 
supply business which was not fully deregulated until 2002. However the system as a whole was certainly 
‘liberalised’ after the implementation of many of the recommendations of the 1993  Monopolies and   11
 
This study conducts a more thorough analysis of the possibility of structural 
breaks compared with Asche et al. (2006)3.  We mitigate the potential limitations 
of the relatively short span of data by employing three different methodological 
approaches. In addition it provides a recursive framework to identify potential 
structural breaks,  focuses on the nature of the relationship in the short-run and 
whether it is linear or not, and finally uses impulse response function to trace the 
results of shocks to the system. 
 
Economic theory suggests that past changes in the oil price cause current changes 
in the price of UK gas but not vice versa. Apart from the fact that Continental gas 
prices are indexed to the price of oil and not vice-versa, it seems unlikely that the 
gas price would be able to influence the oil price. The size of the contract market 
and volumes traded for oil are vastly greater than for the gas market4. The Brent 
crude oil price is an international price determined in large part by the world 
supply and demand for oil, whereas the UK gas market is, by definition, only a 
national one. However, it is possible that expectations of an oil-gas relationship 
could cause gas prices to feed back onto oil prices. Therefore to investigate these 
possibilities, we employ a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) specification 
to model the UK gas price on the one hand and impulse response functions (IRF) 
are generated on the other to examine the consequences of a shock introduced in 
the oil price. 
                                                                                                                                                   
Mergers Commission Report in 1993 and the industrial and commercial market segments became fully 
competitive (i.e. liberalised) at the same time. 
3 Differences in results with Asche et al (2006) could stem from the inclusion of the electricity price. 
4 Volumes for the Brent oil futures contract market at the IPE per day were 1,639,041 in February 
2002 compared to only 43,560 for the natural gas futures contract market.   12
 
3.  DATA SOURCES 
 
The price of wholesale natural gas in the UK is determined in several markets, 
the Over-the-Counter (OTC) or ‘spot’ market, the On the Day Commodity 
Market (OCM) used primarily for gas balancing purposes, and the IPE gas 
futures market. Price data is available for all three markets which we will use in 
our empirical analysis.   
 
The most liquid market is the OTC market.  Total annual volumes traded at the 
National Balancing Point (NBP) (both physical and ‘paper’ trades) amount to 
around 6 times the throughput of the UK gas pipeline system (Wright 2006, p.69). 
Dealing on the OTC market is usually through bi-lateral trade or through a 
broker and consequently price data is confidential, or only available through 
commercial energy consultancies. PH Heren Ltd, produces a monthly series – the 
‘Heren Index’ – which is a volume-weighted average of OTC transaction prices 
reported during the month in pence/therm. The series commences April 1995 
and PH Heren Ltd has kindly made this data available to the authors.  
 
Another source of wholesale gas price data is the On-the-Day Commodity 
Market (OCM) operated, during the period covered in our study, by EnMO. This 
market was established on 1st October 1999 replacing the original ‘Flexibility 
Mechanism’ operated by the UK pipeline company BG Transco which had been 
originally introduced to provide a mechanism for daily gas balancing on the UK 
pipeline system. EnMO published cash-out price data as a daily series and the 
System Average Price (SAP) is broadly an average trading price for wholesale 
gas measured in pence per kilowatt hour (p/kWh) on a particular day. Although 
the OCM is a relatively small market5 and exhibits a high degree of volatility 
                                                 
5 OCM volumes are only about 10 percent of total UK pipeline throughput (Wright 2006, p.69).   13
there is evidence to suggest that OCM cash-out prices (SAP) are strongly 
correlated with the OTC (spot) prices (OFGEM, 2000, p.25), and can therefore be 
used as a good proxy for the daily spot price in our econometric analysis. 
 
The final source of UK wholesale natural gas price data we shall be employing in 
our analysis is from the International Petroleum Exchange (IPE which is the main 
exchange for trading gas futures contracts in the UK. This futures price series 
began in January 1997 and was established to manage the risk in the underlying 
physical gas market, i.e., the OTC market. The IPE provides daily a one month 
forward price for wholesale natural gas prices for physical delivery within the 
UK natural gas grid at the NBP. As this data series is a one month forward price 
– although it is closely related to the spot price – it experiences less volatility than 
the spot or OCM price data 
 
In Europe and throughout most of the world, gas prices are quoted per KWh. In 
the UK natural gas is usually priced in pence per therm, while in the 
international crude oil markets, oil is priced in US dollars per barrel. We have 
converted both into pence per kilowatt-hour (p/kWh) in order to allow direct 
comparison between the two fuel prices6.  
 
European Gas contracts are mainly indexed against inland German heating and 
fuel oil, and this is where the link with the oil price occurs. Crude oil is 
benchmarked against a variety of blends; in the UK and Europe the benchmark 
blend is Brent. The spot price of Brent crude oil is available from several 
commercial energy agencies and the monthly series is obtained from DataStream.  
                                                 
6 The KWh is a more internationally accepted unit of volume than the therm, one therm = 29.3 
kilowatts an hour. One barrel of Brent crude oil is taken to be equal to 1597 KWh: we have been 
unable to discover a precise calorific definition for Brent, but we believe this is a reasonable 
approximation. Oil in US$ barrel is converted using daily or monthly exchange rates (depending 
on the frequency of the gas data it is being compared to); the oil price in £/barrel can then be 
converted into pence by multiplying by 100 and finally to pence/kWh by dividing by 1597.   14
 
4. UNIT ROOT AND COINTEGRATION TESTS 
 
We consider three unit root tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), the 
Breitung (2001) and Breitung and Taylor (2003) and one proposed by Saikkonen 
and Lutkepohl (2002) and Lanne, Lutkepohl and Saikkonen (2002) (unit root test 
with structural break)7. The first is well known in the literature.  Breitung (2002) 
and Breitung and Taylor (2003) propose a nonparametric unit root test which is 
robust to structural breaks.  Saikkonen and Lutkepohl (2002) and Lanne, 
Lutkepohl and Saikkonen (2002) have proposed a test for processes with level 
shift.  Shift functions could be i) a simple shift dummy, ii) based on the 
exponential distribution function and iii) a rational function in the lag operator 
applied to the shift dummy.  The break data is chosen based on simulation 
results and the AR order on the relevant information criteria.  The unit root tests 
for each series are presented in Table 1.  Each of the three data series for 
wholesale natural gas, i.e., IPE, OCM’s SAP and the Heren Index series exhibit 
unit roots and are integrated of order one, as does the price of Brent crude oil, 
(see Table 1). All tests suggest that the first differences of the series are stationary.  
 
Having established that the wholesale natural gas data and oil price series each 
contain a unit root we can proceed to investigate the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship between the two commodity prices. As explained in the previous 
section we expect the two variables to be cointegrated after the opening of the 
Inter-connector.  However the possibility of a cointegrating relationship 
predating that will also be investigated. 
 
                                                 
7 The Phillips-Perron (PP) was also carried out. The results were similar to ADF and are available 
upon request.   15
Two distinct methodologies are used to test for cointegration; the trace test 
developed by Johansen (1995), and the nonparametric test for cointegration 
proposed by Breitung (2002). 
 
In Johansen’s (1988, 1995) notation, we write a p-dimensional Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) as: 
∆Γ ∆ Π yy y t T ti t i
i
k






1 1 µε ,, . . . ,  (2) 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, yt is the set of I(1) variables discussed 
above, εt niid ~ (,) 0 Σ , µ is a drift parameter, and Π is a (p x p) matrix of the form 
Π= ′ αβ , where α and β are (p x r) matrices of full rank, with β containing the r 
cointegrating vectors and α carrying the corresponding loadings in each of the r 
vectors.  In our approach, we set yt  = [Brent, Heren]′ and  εt = [εBt, εHt]8. 
 
The Johansen procedure, like many others, requires estimation of various 
structural and nuisance parameters. For example, a vector autoregressive (VAR) 
lag order must be specified and the lag parameters estimated (for the lag order 
specification see section 5). To get around this problem we employ the recently 
developed nonparametric test for cointegration due to Breitung (2002). No lag 
structure or deterministic terms need to be estimated. As Breitung (2002) notes: 
“there are a number of situations where the nonparametric approach may be attractive. 
Since the short-run component does not affect the asymptotic null distribution of the test 
statistic, the test is robust against deviations from the usual assumption of linear short-
run dynamics”. 
                                                 
8 The analysis was carried out for SAP and IPE as well and provided similar results. We report 
Heren since this is the longest series. The other two cases are available upon request.   16
 
Both the Johansen and Breitung tests reject the null of zero cointegrating vectors 
between crude oil and the three different proxies for gas. Using the logs of the 
series, the outcome was further confirmed.  The results for both the parametric 
(Johansen) and the nonparametric (Breitung) method are presented in table 29.  
However, relationships between economic variables do not necessary remain the 
same throughout time and various  factors, such as political crises , technology, 
innovation, as well as investment in infrastructure (such as the building of the 
inter connector) can influence and alter the nature of the relationship. 
 
To test the stability of the results presented in Table 2 on the one hand and 
examine potential changes in the relationship between the two variables over 
time, we employ a recently developed econometric methodology.  Following 
Hansen & Johansen (1999) we consider the parameter constancy in the 
cointegrated VAR model.  This is very useful since we would like to examine 
whether the opening of the UK-Mainland Europe inter-connector has affected the 
relationship between oil and gas.  The adopted methodology recursively 
estimates the trace test (see Johansen 1995 and Hansen & Johansen 1999) and 
uses the time paths of the estimated parameters as a diagnostic tool in evaluating 
the parameter constancy.  Figures 3 and 5 present the results.  We calculate the 
trace test statistic for each additional observation using an expanding window 
and then divide the test statistic by the critical value.  If this fraction is greater 
than one then the two series are cointegrated and there is a long-run relationship.  
If it is below one the two series are not cointegrated.  As it is obvious from both 
graphs the ratio is above unity throughout our sample for both the levels and the 
logs of the prices.  The latter allows us to conclude firstly, that the prices were 
cointegrated for the whole period 1996-2003 and that the Interconnector did not 
                                                 
9 The bounds test for cointegration proposed by Pesaran et al (2001) was also estimated 
confirming the conclusions of table 2. The results are available upon request.   17
change that relationship, and secondly, that the (potential) outliers did not alter 
this relationship at any point in time.  
 
The long-run solution estimates for all the series are presented in Table 3.  The 
estimates vary from 0.38 (2) to 0.855 (4).  The coefficients for IPE and Heren are 
very close (around 0.5 for the levels and 0.8 for the logs).  The long-run 
coefficient for SAP is the smallest in both cases (equations (2) and (5)).  The next 
step was to investigate whether there were considerable changes in magnitudes 
of these coefficients throughout the period and especially whether the 
Interconnector has affected the relationship.  In other words we ask ‘how long-
run is our long-run solution?’  We proceed with estimating the recursive β’s 
together with their standard errors (see equation 3 in the next section), using an 
expanding window.  Each point in the graph corresponds to what an investigator 
at the time would have found (see Figures 4 and 6). In 1999 we observe a 
reduction in the Brent long-run coefficient which suggests a smaller dependency 
during that year and up to mid 2000. This seems to be reverted from mid 2001 up 
to the end of our sample (see Figure 4).  The same picture emerges from the log 
analysis (see Figure 6).  In both cases little variation appears after 2001.  Note 
here that the last point in Figure 6 corresponds to the long-run solutions 
presented in Table 3 (0.855 and (-1)* -0.542 respectively).  
 
To sum-up, both methodologies support the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship between UK gas prices and the oil price in the period prior to the 
opening of the Bacton - Zeebrugge gas Interconnector10. These results provide 
support for the theory that an equilibrium relationship between UK gas prices 
and the oil price existed before the opening of the gas Interconnector.  The long 
run coefficients decrease in the first 15 months of the operation but quickly 
                                                 
10 Two periods when the Interconnector was shut were not included in the data analysis – 16-26 July 2000 
and 17-27 September 2001.   18
moved upwards after that.  Our initial findings, therefore, indicate the presence 
of a long-run equilibrium relationship but does not imply a linear short-run 
specification.   
 
5. ERROR CORRECTION MODELS AND LINEARITY TESTING 
 
Linearity is an underlying assumption of the VECM model (2).  However, many 
aspects of economic behaviour may not be linear (see the discussion in Campbell 
et al 1997).  In this part we investigate potential deviations from linearity.  Many 
tests for neglected non-linearity have been proposed in the literature.  Instead of 
using a single statistical test, for the purposes of this paper, four different tests 
are considered; McLeod & Li (1983), Engle LM (1982), Tsay (1986) and the Brock 
et al (BDS) (1996).  All these tests share the principle that once any (linear or non-
linear) structure is removed from the data, any remaining structure should be 
due to an (unknown) non-linear data generating mechanism.  All the procedures 
embody the null hypothesis that the series under consideration is an i.i.d. 
process.  
 
The McLeod & Li test looks at the autocorrelation function of the squares of the 
prewhitened data and tests whether corr (
2 2, k t t e e − ) is non-zero for some k and can 
be considered as an LM statistic against ARCH effects (see Granger & Terasvirta 
1993; Patterson & Ashley 2000).  The test suggested by Engle (1982) is an LM test, 
which should have considerable power against GARCH alternatives (see 
Granger & Terasvirta 1993; Bollerslev, 1986).  The Tsay (1986) test explicitly looks 
for quadratic serial dependence in the data and has proven to be powerful 
against a TAR (Threshold Autoregressive) process.  The BDS test is a 
nonparametric test for serial independence based on the correlation integral of 
the scalar series, {et} (see Brock, Hsieh & LeBaron 1991 and Granger & Terasvirta 
1993).  This is a general linearity test where the alternative to linearity can be 
considered to be a stochastic non-linear model (Granger & Terasvirta 1993).  The   19
reader is also referred to the detailed discussion of these tests in the technical 
appendix and the simulations in Patterson & Ashley (2000). 
 
6.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
A general-to-specific approach is followed where each VECM was estimated for 
i= 0 to 6 and lag order was selected using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
and the Hannan-Quin Information criterion (HQ).  The results for both the raw 
data and the logs are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  The error correction term is 
significant in both models 2 and 3 for the Heren equation11 and the lagged values 
of both variables are found to be significant..  
 
The residuals of these models were saved and the four tests for linearity were 
estimated. These tests could provide us with information about any neglected 
non-linearity present in the VECM on the one hand and on the other guide us 
into the nature of this (potential) non-linearity (McLeod & Li for ARCH, Engle 
for GARCH, Tsay for TAR and BDS as general linearity test).  Table 6 reports the 
tests for residuals of models 1 and 2. The employed tests are, like most 
econometric procedures, only asymptotically justified. Given the limited sample 
available, the tests are estimated using both the asymptotic theory and the 
bootstrap.  The values under ‘asymptotic theory’ are based on the large sample 
distributions of the relevant test statistics. For the ‘Bootstrap’ results, 1000 new 
samples are independently drawn from the empirical distribution of the pre-
whitened data.  Each new sample is used to calculate a value for the test statistic 
under the null hypothesis of serial independence.  The obtained fraction of the 
1000 test statistics, which exceeds the sample value of the test statistic from the 
original data, is then reported as the significance level at which the null 
                                                 
11 We are interested in the equation where (L)Heren is the dependent variable as Brent is affected by other 
factors.   20
hypothesis can be rejected (for a detailed discussion on the sample size, the 
asymptotic theory and the bootstrap see Patterson and Ashley 2000). 
 
Throughout the battery of the tests we can accept the null hypothesis that the 
residuals of the second equation in both cases are i.i.d (we are not interested in 
the residuals of the Brent equation since this is affected by other factors). 
 
To summarise the results, we have used a vector error correction specification to 
capture the short run dynamics of the relationship between oil and gas prices in 
the light of the completion of the Interconnector pipeline which connects the oil-
indexed continental gas markets with the UK. We have found evidence that this 
mechanism is linear using four different test statistics which conclude that the 
employed VECM can satisfactory explain the dynamics of the series. 
 
7. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS 
 
Using the VECM system that has been estimated in the previous section, we 
extend the analysis and generate impulse response functions. A shock to the ith 
variable not only directly affects the ith variable but it is also transmitted to all 
the other endogenous variables through the dynamic (lag) structure of the 
VECM. An impulse response function (IRF) traces the effect of a one-time shock 
to one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous 
variables. If the innovations εt are contemporaneously uncorrelated, the 
interpretation of the impulse response is straightforward. The ith innovation εi,t is 
simply a shock to the ith endogenous variable yit.  
 
The generalised IRF (GIRF) can be defined as 
 
  ] [ ] , [ ) , , ( 1 1 , 1 − + − + − − = t n t t t j n t t t y E y E n GIRF ϖ ω ε ω ε      (3)   21
where yt is a random vector,  i t+ ε  is a random shock,  1 − t ϖ  a specific realisation of 
the information set  1 − Ωt  and n is the forecast horizon. The GIRF is a random 
variable given by the difference between two conditional expectations which are 
themselves random variables. We estimate the generalized impulses (GIRF) 
following Pesaran and Shin (1998). They construct an orthogonal set of 
innovations that does not depend on the VAR ordering. The generalized impulse 
responses from an innovation to the jth variable are derived by applying a 
variable specific Cholesky factor computed with the jth variable at the top of the 
Cholesky ordering [for more details see Pesaran and Shin (1998)]. 
 
It would be useful to point out that that IRF analysis can be viewed as a 
‘conceptual experiment’. We are interested in investigating the consequences of 
introducing a shock to the oil price. Figures 7 and 8 present the results of our IRF 
analysis. Introducing a positive shock to the oil price, we observe a negative 
response from gas price which dies out after 7 periods (response standard errors 
were calculated using 1000 Monte Carlo repetitions). However this response is 
not statistically different from zero. In the second graph the shock is introduced 
to the log prices (Model 3). Again a negative response from Gas price is observed 




It has been frequently argued that in liberalised gas markets like the UK, the link 
with oil prices, typically witnessed in pre-liberalised markets, disappears, or at 
least becomes considerably less pronounced.  However between 1999 and the 
end of 2000 the link between oil and gas prices in the UK appears to be strong. 
The sharp increase in UK wholesale natural gas prices during this period was 
attributed by ILEX (2001) to the opening of the UK-Belgium gas pipeline, the 
argument being that this gave opportunities to both the UK and Continental gas 
traders for arbitrage profits thereby indirectly linking UK gas prices to World oil   22
prices.  The important point to emphasise here is that such a consequence of the 
physical linkage to European gas markets is still perfectly consistent with the 
‘orthodox’ liberalisation argument; i.e. it suggests that had the physical 
integration not taken place, UK gas prices would have remained ‘decoupled’ – a 
property of the UK gas market which orthodox liberalisation theory attributes to 
the structural changes in the industry which took place c.1994.  
 
This paper provides evidence that the UK gas prices are cointegrated with oil 
prices using the Johansen methodology and the recently developed Breitung 
nonparametric procedure. However, using recursive techniques it has also been 
demonstrated that cointegration is accepted throughout the whole sample period 
1996-2003  and that this relationship was not affected by the opening of the 
Interconnector.  The existence of a cointegrating relationship prior to the 
inauguration of the Interconnector indicates that despite the highly liberalized 
nature of the UK gas market, gas prices and oil prices are moving together in the 
long-run.  This casts doubts in the efforts of the European Commission to 
liberalize the gas markets  
 
In the same framework, the long run coefficients reduced considerably (from 1 to 
0.2) for the first 15 months but seem to converge to a 0.5 (or 0.8 for the logs) long 
run value.  We employed a VECM specification to capture the short-run 
dynamics. Three tests for neglected non-linearity were calculated: the McLeod-Li 
and Engle test for (G)ARCH effects and the BDS test statistic  as general test for 
linearity. Bootstrap values as well as asymptotic are presented. Strong evidence 
emerges to support the argument that the relationship between oil and gas is a 
linear one.  Finally, we generated impulse response functions to investigate the 
response of Gas price as a result of a shock introduced in the price of oil.   
Negative responses from gas seem to die out quickly.   23
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Note: see the discussion in Section 3 for the unit of measurement.    28
Figure 3: Recursive Trace tests (Heren-Brent) 
Critical Values from MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
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Figure 4: Recursive Beta Coefficients (Heren-Brent) 
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Figure 5: Recursive Trace test (LHeren – LBrent) 
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Figure 6: Recursive Beta Coefficients (LHeren - LBrent) 
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Figure 7: Impulse response Function (from Model 1). Response standard errors 
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Figure 8 Impulse Response Function (from Model 2). Response standard errors 
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Table 1: Unit Root tests  
 
  SAMPLE    LEVELS  FIRST DIFFERENCES  LEVELS-LOGS 
FIRST DIFFERENCES-
LOGS 
     t-Statistic  Prob.*  t-Statistic  Prob.* t-Statistic  Prob.*  t-Statistic  Prob.* 
Brent 1996:01-2003:6  ADF  -1.6102  0.4733  -12.9788  0.0001  -1.7962  0.3802  -11.8837  0.0001
   Breitung  0.0481  0.4000  0.0004  0.0000  0.0433  0.4000  0.0006  0.0000
  
UR with Structural 
Break  -0.7447  Used Break Date  2000:12   -1.592  Used Break Date  1999:3
Heren 1996:01-2003:6  ADF  -0.7310  0.3972  -7.0174  0.0000  -2.7727  0.0660  -7.5093  0.0000
   Breitung  0.0419  0.2000  0.0005  0.0000  0.0446  0.3000  0.0006  0.0000
  
UR with Structural 
Break  -2.1991  Used Break Date  2002:3  -2.4257  Used Break Date  1999:2
IPE 1997:01-2003:7  ADF -1.9892  0.2910  -7.2432  0.0000  -2.4529  0.1311  -7.0196  0.0000
   Breitung  0.0430  0.9000  0.0007  0.0000  0.0482  0.4000  0.0008  0.0000
  
UR with Structural 
Break  -2.0514  Used Break Date  2003:2  -2.0695  Used Break Date  2003:2
SAP 1997:12-2003:7  ADF  -2.3988  0.1462  -9.7133  0.0000  -0.8105  0.3610  -8.8628  0.0000
   Breitung  0.0234  0.5000  0.0002  0.0000  0.0285  0.3000  0.0003  0.0000
  
UR with Structural 
Break  -1.4107  Used Break Date  2001:4  -1.5381  Used Break Date  2002:11
   CV (ADF & PP):  1% level  -3.499167  5% level  -2.89155  10% level  -2.582846  
   CV (Lanne et al. 2001):  1% level  -3.48  5% level  -2.88  10% level  -2.58   
 
Note: *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic, CV Critical Values, ADF Lag 
Length:  (Decision based on Schwartz Info Criterion, MINLAG=0 MAXLAG=11), Breitung test is the nonparametric unit root test 
suggested by Breitung (2002),  The p-value of the test is simulated on the basis of a Gaussian AR(p) model for z(t)-z(t-1), in 
batches of k replications.  The errors are drawn from the normal distribution with zero mean and variances the squared OLS 
residuals (wild bootstrapping).  Unit Root test (UR) with structural break is the unit root tests suggested by Saikonen and 
Lutkepohl (2002) and Lanne et al (2002).   33
 
Table 2: Testing for Cointegration 
 
   
H0: 
rank<= Trace Test [Prob] 
Breitung 
Test  10%CV 5% CV 
Simulated
p-values  Data 
1Heren-Brent 0  23.67  0.015**  454.66** 261  329.9  0.0154**  1996:1-2003:6 
    1  2.2 0.737 18.06 67.89  95.6  0.5361     
2SAP-Brent 0  28.41  0.002*** 330.06** 261  329.9  0.0487**  1997:12-2003:6 
    1  4.06 0.415 16.63 67.89  95.6  0.5808     
3IPE-Brent 0  23.94  0.013**  396.15** 261  329.9  0.0251**  1997:1-2003:6 
    1  2.08 0.759 15.11 67.89  95.6  0.654   
                 
4LHeren-LBrent 0  22.55 0.022**  369.93**  261 329.9  0.0368**  1996:1-2003:6 
   1  2.45  0.69  18.48  67.89 95.6 0.5265   
5LSAP-LBrent 0 26.07  0.006*** 288.34* 261  329.9  0.0771*  1997:12-2003:6 
    1  3.94 0.433 15.28 67.89  95.6  0.6411   
6LIPE-LBrent 0  19.98  0.053*  366.04** 261  329.9  0.0358**  1997:1-2003:6 
    1  2.22 0.734 14.78 67.89  95.6  0.6568   
**, * denotes rejection at the 1%, and 5% significance level respectively (critical values 
from Doornik, 1998). Trace Test is the cointegration test proposed by Johansen (1995). 
Breitung test is the nonparametric cointegration test suggested by Breitung (2002). The 
simulated  p-values are based on 10000 replications of Gaussian random walks with 
length n = 90. 
 
Table 3: Long-run Cointegrating Equations (Johansen) 
 
   Constant s.e. Coefficient s.e. 
(1)  Heren= 0.033 + 0.567 Brent  (0.078) (0.089) 
(2)  SAP = 0.179 + 0.38 Brent  (0.067) (0.071) 
(3)  IPE =  0.07 + 0.54 Brent  (0.064) (0.07) 
(4)  LHeren = -0.542 + 0.855 LBrent  (0.061) (0.1698) 
(5)  LSAP = -0.61 + 0.592 LBrent  (0.042772) (0.11204) 
(6)  LIPE = -0.51 + 0.808 LBrent  (0.047) (0.12) 
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Table 4: VECM for Brent – Heren (Model 1) 
  D(BRENT)  D(HEREN) 
D(BRENT(-1)) -0.366263  -0.202569 
 [-3.145]  [-2.849] 
D(BRENT(-2)) -0.159369  -0.137813 
 [-1.323]  [-1.874] 
D(BRENT(-3)) 0.136781  -0.175990 
 [  1.198]  [-2.524] 
D(HEREN(-1)) -0.151838  0.386844 
 [-0.941]  [  3.926] 
D(HEREN(-2)) 0.029989  0.033838 
  [ 0.173]  [ 0.320] 
D(HEREN(-3)) 0.271467  0.007904 
  [ 1.600]  [ 0.076] 
C 0.004508  0.003308 
  [ 0.371]  [ 0.446] 
CV1(-1) -0.054633  -0.278945 
 (0.09937)  (0.06067) 
 [-0.550]  [-4.598] 
R-squared 0.195086  0.317301 
Adj. R-squared  0.125526  0.258302 
S.E. equation  0.113984  0.069594 
F-statistic 2.804560  5.378101 
Log likelihood  71.18688  115.0975 
Akaike AIC  -1.419930  -2.406685 
Schwarz SC  -1.196232  -2.182987 
Log likelihood  186.6995 
Akaike information criterion  -3.835943 
Schwarz criterion  -3.388548 
 
 
Table 5 VECM for LBrent – LHeren (Model 2) 
  D(LBRENT)  D(LHEREN) 
D(LBRENT(-1)) -0.227250  -0.144515 
 [-2.112]  [-1.249] 
D(LHEREN(-1)) -0.120214  0.335327 
 [-1.324]  [  3.435] 
C 0.006452  0.004084 
  [ 0.494]  [ 0.291] 
CV2(-1) -0.014647  -0.211189 
 (0.04810)  (0.05171) 
 [-0.304]  [-4.084] 
 R-squared  0.074198  0.220152 
 Adj. R-squared  0.041523  0.192628 
 Sum sq. resids  1.287229  1.487766 
 S.E. equation  0.123060  0.132299 
 F-statistic  2.270777  7.998548 
 Log likelihood  62.22290   55.78002 
 Akaike AIC  -1.308380  -1.163596 
 Schwarz SC  -1.196531  -1.051747 
 Mean dependent  0.004942  0.005692 
 S.D. dependent  0.125698  0.147238 
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)   0.000263 
 Determinant resid covariance   0.000240 
 Log likelihood   118.3787 
 Akaike information criterion  -2.480420 
 Schwarz criterion  -2.256722 
 
Standard Errors in ( ) and t-statistics in [ ]  
CV1 and CV2 are the error correction terms. 
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Table 6: Linearity Tests for the Residuals of Models 1 and 2  
(only from the Heren and LHeren equations) 
  εH (from Model 1)  εLH (from Model 2) 
  BOOTSTRAPASYMPTOTIC BOOTSTRAPASYMPTOTIC 
MCLEOD-LI TEST       
USING UP TO LAG 20  0.895 1.00 0.829 1.00 
USING UP TO LAG 24  0.882 1.00 0.753 1.00 
      
ENGLE TEST      
USING UP TO LAG 1  0.703 0.777 0.772 0.827 
USING UP TO LAG 2  0.782 0.891 0.774 0.891 
USING UP TO LAG 3  0.920 0.972 0.894 0.968 
USING UP TO LAG 4  0.967 0.993 0.961 0.992 
      
TSAY TEST  0.631 0.721 0.658 0.726 
      
BDS      
Dimension       
2  0.1108 0.0649 0.3412 0.3031 
3  0.1348 0.0942 0.4062 0.4004 
4  0.1810 0.1477 0.6064 0.6783 
5  0.1804 0.1523 0.7102 0.8391 
6  0.2938 0.3109 0.6266 0.7477 
 
Note: only p-values are reported 